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1. INTRODUCTION
In “Are arguments abstract objects”, Steven Patterson first motivates the issue of the
nature of arguments with some comments on my “Is argument subject to the
product/process ambiguity?” He then turns to presenting and criticizing SimardSmith and Moldovan’s account of arguments found in their “Arguments as abstract
objects”. In the last section he explores an analogy between works of music and
arguments that motivates him to propose treating ‘argument’ as an open concept. In
what follows I will very briefly address some minor issues with his criticisms, but
then focus most of my attention on his analogy and his resulting proposal.
2. MINOR COMMENTS
Concerning my survey of the possibilities for arguments, Patterson writes: “Note,
however, that the fundamental thing all three conceptions share… is the notion that
arguments are sets of somethings.”(p. 3) Not so—I do not restrict my discussion to
sets of somethings. For example, I do not merely consider the possibility that an
argument is a set of sentence tokens, but also the possibility that it is the particular
sentence tokens (or is the very speech acts or…). Sets are abstract objects and so
assuming that the advocates of act-based or sentence-based theories of arguments
really meant sets of such acts or sentences would be uncharitable.
Concerning my take on act-based accounts of arguments, he writes: “thinking
of argument as the product of a process or act has the advantage of solving this
problem rather handily—all and only those groupings that come into being as the
result of an act of arguing could count as arguments. … So it’s not as if process or
act-based conceptions of argument have nothing going for them, as Goddu seems at
times to suggest.”(p. 4) Firstly, it would only solve the problem if it were the case
that arguments are the product of the process of arguing. But we have good reasons
to think that is not the case. Secondly, we need to be clear about what an act-based
theory of argument is. We could mean one that literally takes arguments to be in the
ontological category of acts. But such theories cannot solve the classification
problem—the problem of identifying the features that make something an
argument—by appeal to the product/process distinction since the arguments are
not produced by the acts of arguing, they literally are the acts of arguing. Note also
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that the classification problem just re-emerges in a different form—once we have
established that arguments are acts, we need to know what features an act has to
have in order to be an argument.
Alternatively, we could mean that a theory is act-based if it appeals to acts to
solve the classification problem. For example, one could hold that arguments are
groups of propositions. Which groups of propositions are the arguments—the ones
that come into existence in virtue of acts of arguing. These sorts of ‘act-based’
theories I do object to—for the simple reason that whatever ontological category
arguments are in, they are not the products of an act of arguing. Note also that I do
not eschew the potential benefit of appealing to some sort of activity to delineate
arguments—I just deny that if we delineate arguments via appeal to some activity,
the activity will be that of arguing. But if ‘argument creating’ were a particular kind
of identifiable practice, then we could identify arguments as the products of that
process (and nothing in my paper is directed against that possibility.) Note also, to
carry Patterson’s analogy with music and art further, that some people do hold that
what makes something a work of art is that it is produced by the right kind of
creative process. (BBC) Nothing I have said rules out a similar sort of appeal in the
case of arguments.
Finally, I have already had my crack at Simard-Smith and Moldovan’s paper
(Goddu, 2012) and have never been a fan of appeal to ‘intentions’ in the definition of
‘argument’, (though a full scale argument against such definitions is a project for the
future) so I will pass over Patterson’s arguments against their definition of
argument. Instead I shall focus on Patterson’s more positive suggestions.
3. ANALOGY AND OPEN CONCEPT
Suppose we want to know what an argument is. One strategy would be to assume
that arguments are in a single ontological category, determine that category, and
then within that category distinguish the arguments from the non-arguments. For
example, if we were to determine that arguments are sets of propositions, we would
then need to distinguish those sets that were arguments from those that were not.
Call this the Ontology First Strategy. Another strategy would be to try to determine
necessary and sufficient conditions for something being an argument. In some cases
the ontology of arguments would explicitly drop out. For example, x is an argument
iff x is a set of propositions with properties A, B, C. But in other cases the ontology
might not line up so neatly with the Ontology First Strategy. For example, x is an
argument iff x is a reason/claim complex does not specify the ontological category of
arguments. It could turn out that complexes of reasons and claims would be in a
single ontological category, but it could also turn out that such complexes could
have instances in different ontological categories. Either way, the ontology of
arguments would be a consequence of the ontology of reasons, claims, and
complexes of the two. Call this strategy the Necessary/Sufficient Conditions
Strategy.
Another strategy, the one Patterson adopts in his paper, would be to argue
that arguments are analogous to some other sort of entity, say, works of music, and
appeal to the nature and properties of these analogous entities to reveal the nature
2

GEOFFREY C. GODDU
and properties of arguments. Call this the Analogy Strategy. Based on the analogy
and the claim that treating ‘musical work’ as an open concept is more fruitful,
Patterson recommends treating ‘argument’ as an open concept, roughly a concept
that does not have necessary and sufficient conditions of application. One of the
benefits of treating ‘argument’ as an open concept is, according to Patterson, that it
avoids the classification problem. Roughly, treating ‘argument’ as an open concept
involves identifying a sufficient number of paradigm cases and some proper
similarity relations we can use to adjudicate new candidates. The new candidates
that are properly similar to, i.e., continuous with, the paradigm cases are also
arguments. But now further cases can be compared against the new larger group of
arguments and it can turn out additional candidates will be properly similar to the
new larger group even though they might have failed to be properly similar to the
original group of paradigms. In such a fashion the group of things that fall under the
concept of ‘argument’ can accrete new members in a way that seems to defy the
production of necessary and sufficient conditions for being an argument. As
Patterson puts it, the open concept approach avoids the classification problem
“because the boundaries of an open concept are not fixed by firm criteria that need
to be satisfied in advance.”(pp. 16-17).
Assume the analogy with musical works holds and assume that a
consequence is that ‘argument’ is more fruitfully treated as an open concept rather
than a closed concept. Does treating ‘argument’ as an open concept avoid the
classification problem? Not really. At best it merely redefines what counts as
successfully solving the problem. If you think there are necessary and sufficient
conditions for something being an argument, then successfully solving the
classification problem will involve giving those conditions. If on the other hand you
think there are no such conditions, solving the problem may involve providing the
paradigmatic cases, identifying the properties that make them paradigmatic,
identifying the similarity relations that non-paradigmatic cases should have to count
as arguments, etc. Both sides are trying to identify arguments and distinguish
arguments from non-arguments—they just disagree about how crisply this can be
done (and perhaps whether, in principle, the identifying the relevant criteria work
can ever be finished). But either way they are still trying to distinguish arguments
from non-arguments and give criteria by which this distinguishing can be done.
In fact a Necessary/Sufficient Conditions strategist might pretend ‘argument’
is an open concept as a stepping stone to discovering the necessary and sufficient
conditions for being an argument. For example, a Necessary/Sufficient Conditions
strategist can start by collecting a paradigmatic group of arguments, determine the
properties shared by all the members of the paradigm, and then provide transitive
similarity relations for judging new cases. Alternatively, the strategist can accept
that the similarity relations are not transitive, but just grant that the resulting
necessary and sufficient conditions will most likely be quite complicated and
ultimately disjunctive in form. But either way, the Necessary/Sufficient Conditions
strategist can explore the nature of arguments in a way consistent with those who
believe that ‘argument’ is an open concept.
Assume the analogy with musical works holds. Is it a consequence that
‘argument’ is more fruitfully treated as an open concept? Not necessarily. As
3
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Patterson points out, the open concept approach is contentious even within the field
of music ontology, so it is far from clear that a successful analogy will support
treating ‘argument’ as an open concept.
Does the analogy with musical works hold? While I certainly find the analogy
suggestive and have myself pondered whether arguments can be fruitfully
compared to plays or poems ontologically, I finish with some challenges to certain
aspects of Patterson’s proposed analogy.
Patterson writes: “It would be strange to think that in one context an object is
a work of art, while in another context it fails to be so.”(p. 14) But consider, Marcel
Duchamp’s Fountain. If it is art, then we must be committed to porcelain urinals
everywhere being art or if not, we must deny the experts who say that Fountain is
one of the most influential works of art in the 20th century.(BBC) Similarly, in certain
contexts four minutes, thirty-three seconds of silence is just that, but in others it is a
performance of John Cage’s 4’33’’. But if being a work of music or art is contextually
dependent, while being an argument is not, then we should be wary of what sorts of
ontological conclusions we can draw about arguments on the basis of works of
music.
Patterson also claims that “both musical works and arguments are human
creations.”(p. 10) This may be true. My denial of arguments being the product of the
act of arguing does not mean they are not the products of some human activity. But I
have also left it open that arguments are not created, but rather discovered. Some
think that logic proofs and math proofs are a type of argument, and it is fairly
common to talk in terms of discovering proofs for certain claims rather than
creating them. More generally, if arguments are ‘reasons for a given claim’, then it is
perfectly reasonable to think of arguments as discovered rather than created. Since
the claims are given, we do not create them. It is also perfectly reasonable to talk of
discovering reasons for those claims rather than creating reasons for those claims.
Once we have discovered what we take to be adequate reasons for a given claim,
and have adequately expressed those reasons in support of the claim, we might
create the awareness or knowledge of an argument that we were not aware of
before, but it does not automatically follow that we created the argument. Even
more generally, given that Patterson grants that arguments are at least partially
abstract (p. 10), I wonder how one goes about creating an abstract object. But if
arguments are discovered rather than created, while works of music are created,
then once again there is a significant disanalogy that threatens the drawing of any
ontological conclusions about arguments on the basis of works of music.
4. CONCLUSION
Are arguments relevantly analogous to works of music? Is ‘argument’ an open
concept? I do not know, but these questions are certainly worth exploring. Even my
doubts about the analogy are suggestive rather than conclusive. At the same time, as
far as I can see, exploring these questions is perfectly consistent with continuing to
carefully seek necessary and sufficient conditions for being an argument.
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